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Defining Shariʿa in China: State, Ahong, and the Postsecular Turn 
 
Matthew S. Erie, Princeton University 
 
Show us the straight path. The path of those whom Thou hath favored. 
Not of those who earn Thine anger nor of those who go astray. 
 
—Quran 1:6–7, cited in a collection of sermons 
produced by the Chinese government (Anon. 2011) 
 
Abstract 
 
Just as shariʿa (Islamic law) has been demonized globally, so too, paradoxically, have 
governments sought to appropriate Islamic authority for secular rule. Based on nineteen 
months of field research in northwest China, this article offers some preliminary thoughts 
on the ways in which the party-state manipulates shariʿa for purposes of rule. Through 
the example of the China Islamic Association, an organization constituted under the 
Chinese Communist Party in 1953, the author argues that the party-state’s evolving 
relationship to Islamic authority demonstrates what he calls the “postsecular.” Rather 
than discursively demarcating (legitimate) secular law from (illegitimate) religious law, 
the China Islamic Association has, since 2001, a watershed year in the relationship 
between secular and Islamic authority, sought to expound law from the revealed sources 
of Islam that are congruent with Chinese socialism and nationalism. 
 
Keywords: Islamic law, Northwest China, China Islamic Association, postsecular, 
ethnography 
 
Introduction 
In his Public Religions in the Modern World, sociologist José Casanova argues that 
religions have undergone a process he calls “deprivatization” (1994, 6), the 
(re)emergence of faith in the public sphere, traditionally understood in modernization 
theory as the realm of deliberative rationality. Eminent philosopher Charles Taylor, 
however, claims that we inhabit a secular age, defined by the decentering of God in the 
public sphere, the decline of belief in the transcendent, and the engendering of “new 
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conditions of belief” ([2007] 2009, 20). On the one hand, an empirically rich and globe-
spanning study heralds religious revival; on the other hand, a leading philosopher 
meditates on the eclipsing of the sacred by the secular. How to make sense of these two 
views? Should they be reconciled? And why would such an accommodation matter? 
German sociologist and philosopher Jürgen Habermas provides a third and 
intermediary view in his remarkable essay “Notes on a Post-Secular Society,” in which 
the champion of rationalism observes a change in global consciousness through the 
experience of religion (2008). Casanova, Taylor, and Habermas each offer a different 
critique of modernization theory, the presumption that modernity—as secularism, 
rationality, and science—supplants primordial affections. Habermas’s essay demonstrates 
that what he terms the “post-secular” may share affinities with the novel and creative 
forms of thought and being that Taylor defines as secular, but that coexist and perhaps 
even depend on resurgent faiths. 
Each of the writings focuses on the issue of religion in the West. In particular, the 
arguments are premised on the political philosophy of Western liberalism and democratic 
institutions. Law plays an important role in mediating relations between the state and 
religion in this model. Liberalism has traditionally been equated with universal rights that 
are negative (i.e., held against the state) and borne by the individual as rights holder 
(Bobbio 1996). That is, through law, citizens limit the state’s power to intrude on their 
capacity to cultivate their own cultured identity, as expressed in the aspiration “the 
separation of church and state.” Multiculturalists, neo-Marxists, culture critics, and 
anthropologists, however, have chipped away at the edifice of liberalism and its 
assumptions (Kymlicka 1989, [1996] 2001; Turner 1994; Brownlie 1995; Tully 1995; 
Gledhill 1997; Thompson 1997; Niezen 2003). The transformative processes observed by 
Casanova, Taylor, and Habermas, and particularly the expansion of the domain of 
religions beyond the state-sanctioned private sphere, suggest categorical confusion 
regarding where the line between “secular” and “non-”, “a-”, or “postsecular” is drawn. 
Most strikingly, it is not just state law that shapes the relationship between the state and 
religion but also evolving interpretations of religious or non-state law that have emerged 
from primordialism to color the postsecular. 
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The religious law most commonly associated with challenges to secularism is that 
of Islam.1 A wellspring of studies has demonstrated the normative, ethical, and legal 
pluralism practiced by Muslim minorities living in Western states (Ramadan 1999; Emon 
2006, 2007; Maurer 2006; Ramadan 2008; Fadel 2009; Rohe 2009; Christoffersen 2010). 
A touchstone of analysis among the literature on Muslim minorities is the status of 
shariʿa2 under state law, especially in the areas of what civil law terms “personal status,” 
or what common law in the Anglo-American tradition calls “family law” (Pearl and 
Menski 1998; Ferrari and Bradney 2000; Rohe 2007; Bowen 2011; Macfarlane 2012). 
One of the world’s leading experts on shariʿa, Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im has 
advocated the position that Muslims (minority or majority) can pursue their conviction to 
abide by shariʿa only under a secular state (An-Na’im 2008a, 2008b). Professor An-
Na’im argues that the secular state, which he defines as one that maintains neutrality 
toward any single religious doctrine or creed, guarantees freedom of individual choice 
(An-Na’im 2008a, 4). 
Professor An-Na’im’s thesis is compelling, but how does the argument for the 
necessity of a secular state as guarantor of religious freedom hold up against Habermas’s 
assertion that we have entered a postsecular age? The neutrality of states vis-à-vis 
religion and religious law has been eroded in the post-9/11 era (Leigh and Ahdar 2012). 
The reduction of Islam to extremism and fundamentalism, whether in the most intimate 
matters (e.g., male domination in marital relations) or in the public sphere, as most 
acutely perceived in the threat of terrorism, is not only an effect of media and its 
misrepresentations but of state policy and law, domestic and international. Everywhere, 
the state seems to show its preferences, whether in the French government’s ban of head 
scarves in public schools (Bowen 2007) or the U.S. government’s support of faith-based 
initiatives (Wuthnow 2006). Indeed, following religious laws’ blurring of the private and 
public domains, many states have moved from a stance of neutrality to one of actively 
manipulating non-state laws, practices, and customs, particularly of minority populations, 
to legitimize rule (see, e.g., Povinelli 2002). 
I argue that the shift from the state’s defining itself against religion to 
operationalizing religion as a form of governance lies at the heart of the postsecular. In 
recent years, there has been a sea change in writings in anthropology investigating “the 
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secular,” “secularism,” “the postsecular,” and “postsecularism” (Asad 2003; Mahmood 
2006; Ferrara 2009; Agrama 2012). While Talal Asad’s use of Foucault’s critique of 
genealogies of ideas as power has gained significant purchase in anthropological circles, 
my approach recognizes the significance of discourse but also seeks to underscore the 
centrality of social relations in generating and circumscribing power, a view espoused by 
Weber and Marx. While the writings of Asad and others understand secularism as 
manipulating religion (rather than standing apart from it), the Chinese data shows a 
distinction between secularism (as defined against religion) and postsecularism, 
extending state authority through religion. Consequently, unlike Habermas’s definition, 
which equates the postsecular with a “change in consciousness” (Habermas 2008, 20), I 
define the postsecular as a technique of rule—specifically, one that employs religion in 
the name of secular authority and power. While past treatments of such an approach 
invoke Foucault’s notion of governmentality (see e.g., Ghatak and Abel 2013), I ground 
my understanding of the postsecular in Max Weber’s thought. 
Scholarship on Weber’s sociology of law has emphasized his use of “ideal types.” 
Ideal types are taken to be characteristics of an economy in which all social behaviors are 
dominated by tradition, a system of ethics or religious values, or of market behavior. 
Often these sources are assumed to be discrete, mutually exclusive, and even 
evolutionary or teleological (Rheinstein 1967, xxix). However, Weber’s writings on the 
“routinization of charisma” show the transformation and appropriation of diverse forms 
of authority (Weber [1922] 1978a, 246–251). Weber finds in the Islamic qadi the 
embodiment of the “revolutionary nature” of charisma, as the authoritative figure of a 
system of theocratic justice that is both rationalized and part of an abstract natural law 
(Weber [1922] 1978b, 1116). Similarly, of the Chinese official-scholar bureaucracy, 
Weber observed that much of the prestige of officialdom rested on the charisma of the 
high mandarins (Weber [1951] 1968, 135). Weber noted that traditional charisma could 
be rationalized to serve as the basis for the legitimacy of political and economic 
organization (Weber [1922] 1978a, 251–252), as in the example of democracy in the 
United States (Weber [1922] 1978a, 267). Thus, for Weber, the mobilization of 
traditional authority (whether hereditary, magical, or religious) for governance was 
immanent to the process of modernization. Nonetheless, in Weber’s analysis, personal 
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charisma often subsisted outside of or independent of a system of laws.3 Following 
Weber, this article poses the following question: What do “higher-order” organizations 
(e.g., nation-states) do with the law of ethnoreligious communities subsumed by such 
organizations? In short, while the routinization of religious (i.e., charismatic) authority 
may underlie modernization and secularization, the invocation of the “premodern” law of 
charismatic authority by nation-states may be one hallmark of the postsecular. 
In the remainder of this article, I provide evidence for the postsecular not in the 
West (where the notion originated) but in the most unlikely of places: Communist China.4 
From its establishment of power in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has 
largely denied the existence of shariʿa in China. Rather, the Communists dismantled all 
Islamic political and legal institutions and adopted a discourse that interpellated shariʿa as 
xiguanfa 习惯法 (customary law), an apolitical, ethnicized, desacralized, and localized 
concept. During this period, the China Islamic Association (CIA), an organization 
constituted under the authority of the CCP, has functioned as a bridge between the party-
state and the Muslim masses and implemented CCP rules and state law in Muslim 
communities. However, in 2001, as a response to both the global discourse on Islamic 
terrorism and domestic interethnic violence involving the Uyghurs (Turkic Muslims) in 
Xinjiang, the CCP established the Educational Administration Guidance Committee 
(Jiaowu zhidao weiyuanhui 教务指导委员会, hereinafter EAGC) under the CIA, which 
has sought to cultivate an indigenized Islam in China that adheres to the party line 
through a body of teachings in accordance with shariʿa. The formation of the sub-CIA 
body therefore marks a significant turn in the party-state’s governance toward Islam and 
its legal authorities, one that rules through religious authorities rather than in opposition 
to them. 
 
China’s Islamic Renaissance 
The Chinese Communist approach to Islam in general, and to shariʿa in particular, 
is predicated on the primacy of rule by the party and the nullification of any alternative 
authority. One of the earliest activities of the CCP when it began consolidating power in 
the early 1950s was to dismantle the remnants of Islamic institutions in northwest China. 
Erie   93 
 
Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review 
E-Journal No. 12 (September 2014) • (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-12) 	  
Among Chinese Muslims, or Hui, the institution of the qadi had already faded after the 
fourteenth century.5 Qadi survived until the Republican period (c. 1930), however, 
among the Salar, a Turkic Muslim minority in Qinghai Province (Erie 2013, 134–135), 
and until the early 1950s among the Uyghur in southern Xinjiang (Bellér-Hann 2003, 
189). During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), families who had exercised 
leadership in mosque communities were particularly targeted for public criticism and 
attacked. The Red Guard, the paramilitary youth of the CCP, burned mosques and 
desecrated Muslim cemeteries (Erie 2013, chapter 2). 
Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms commencing in 1978 ushered in a period of 
religious liberalization and relaxation of the party-state’s hostility toward public 
religions. Amendment of the PRC Constitution in 1982 guaranteed freedom of religion 
and protection of “normal religious activities,” thereby providing the state with a legal 
basis for determining the norm (Potter 2003, 325). Over the past thirty years, China has 
experienced religious revivals of all creeds (Chau 2006, 2011; Yang 2008; M. Yang 
2011; F. Yang 2011), including Islam6 (Gladney [1991] 1996, 2004b, 2008; Gillette 
2000). Throughout China, and particularly in the northwest provinces, Hui have built 
mosques, constructed Sufi tomb complexes, established state-run madrasas, and financed 
and formed private Arabic and Farsi schools. Halal (Ch. qingzhen) restaurants can be 
found in nearly every Chinese city. Major cities and ones dominated by Muslims in the 
northwest and in Yunnan Province in the southwest also have Islamic bookstores and 
semipublic sites for assembly, prayer, and discussion. Thus, the Chinese Islamic 
renaissance confirms Casanova’s thesis, in part, although Chinese Muslims have 
encountered difficulties in penetrating public discourse, monopolized by party 
propaganda and nationalist rhetoric. 
At the center of the Islamic revival is the figure of the ahong 阿訇.7 The ahong, as 
the lifeblood of the jamāʿa (community), plays a central role in the well-being of the 
mosque community. The ahong assumes the tasks of the imam (one who leads prayer) 
and the khaṭīb (one who gives the Friday sermon). To some extent, the ahong has 
additionally taken on the duties of the qadi ‎ (Islamic judge) and mufti (legal scholar who 
interprets shariʿa) in addressing the panoply of legal concerns of the community, or 
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jamāʿa. One ahong I spoke with analogized himself to a general practitioner physician, 
saying that his role was “comprehensive.” The legal issues that ahong mediate include 
those between members of the jamāʿa, inter-jamāʿa conflicts, and relations with 
governmental bureaus and party organs. The ahong is community leader, problem solver, 
public relations expert, storehouse of Islamic knowledge, and judge. He is the touchstone 
of communitarian values (Eickelman 1985, 125; Rosen 1989, 58) and therefore a focal 
point of the party-state’s propaganda. As such, he is the pivot between Islamic law and 
state law. 
Reform-era China is certainly not inimical to the growth of Islam. As part of 
China’s “going out” policy in Africa and the Middle East (Kurlantzick 2006; Alden 2007; 
Bello 2007; Manji and Marks 2007; Kemp 2012; Olimat 2012), the party-state has 
encouraged limited connections between Chinese Muslims and Muslims elsewhere. 
Xinjiang, the gateway into Central Asia, is the focus of China’s “New Silk Road” policy 
of accessing markets across the border (Rudelson 1997; Bovingdon 2002b; Gladney 
2004b; Simpfendorfer 2009). In 2010, for instance, the central government nominated 
Kashgar, China’s westernmost city and center of Uyghur culture, as the first inland 
special economic zone (SEZ). Infrastructural projects, such as a railway modernization 
program linking Kashgar to Pakistan, and incentives, such as tax-free zones and other 
preferential policies, have attracted injections of state and private capital. 
In the major cities along the eastern coast, such as Shanghai, Shenzhen, and 
Guangzhou, Muslim businesspeople from North Africa and the Middle East, as well as 
Central Asia and Southeast Asia, have established communities where they purchase 
products wholesale for resale in their respective countries, often assisted by young 
Chinese Muslim translators, fluent in Arabic, from cities in Ningxia, Gansu, and Yunnan 
Provinces. A gem in China’s export-driven economy, the city of Yiwu in Zhejiang 
Province, for instance, has established the world’s largest small commodities market. 
Yiwu, a city of 1.2 million, has twenty thousand itinerant foreign Muslims. Walking 
down the street of the Bin Wang Commercial and Entertainment Zone in the summer of 
2010, I saw tall, thin Egyptian men, short, round Uzbeks, Iranian women in full veil, and 
Uyghur boys selling lamb kabobs. Foreign Muslims purchase US$49.23 billion per year 
worth of clocks, stationery, sandals, religious paraphernalia, stuffed animals, cell phones, 
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jewelry, picture frames, and sex toys for resale in their home countries. These foreign 
Muslims are one segment of a network of vendors, business trade companies, translators, 
middlemen, transporters, and distributors that link Yiwu to consumers from Marrakech to 
Jayapura. 
The Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region has a population of 6.3 million, 35 percent 
of which is Chinese Muslim. In 2003, its government built a halal food industrial zone, 
and three years later, it established trade relations with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United 
Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Malaysia, among other Muslim countries. Since 2008, 
Ningxia halal food production has benefited from US$6.28 million in foreign investment. 
In 2009, halal food production enterprises had realized a total output value of twenty 
billion RMB (US$2.94 billion). Since 2010, thirty-seven halal enterprises have received 
approvals and special loans from the finance administration. 
 Nonetheless, these economic opportunities and the links they establish between 
China and Muslim communities in the Middle East and elsewhere are hardly infinite. 
Many Muslim minorities in Qinghai Province and Gansu Province complain that the 
government prevents such ties for fear that they foster Islamic radicalism in northwestern 
China. In Xinjiang, most Uyghurs I interviewed in 2011 said that the benefits of the SEZ 
would be enjoyed primarily by Han Chinese who migrate to southern Xinjiang in large 
numbers. Likewise, in southern Gansu, one Hui entrepreneur with whom I met regularly 
from 2009 to 2010 complained that the process of obtaining the proper licenses and 
permits to export halal products abroad is prohibitive, both in terms of money and red 
tape. Chinese governance prioritizes control of Muslim minorities’ external contacts over 
economic prosperity. 
 
The Status of Shariʿa in the Party-State 
The approach to incorporating Muslim minorities into the nation-state differs in 
socialist China from the model adopted by Western liberal democracies in several 
respects. Since China’s “opening and reform” in 1978, the CCP has sought to build a 
“socialist rule of law” engineered not to protect individuals from state encroachment but 
to bolster state power through the leadership of the CCP (Wang 1997; Lubman 1999; 
Peerenboom 2002). Thus, the Chinese approach to rights focuses on economic and social 
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rights as well as group rights, rather than individual and negative rights held against the 
state (Svensson 1996; Bauer and Bell 1999; Potter 2001). 
One variant of group rights that the Communists adopted from the Soviets is the 
concept of zizhi 自治 (lit. “self-rule”), or “autonomy,” as applied to China’s Muslim 
population that resides in certain geographically concentrated areas in the northwest, 
including Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region and Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. 
Autonomy has become the cornerstone of the party-state’s policy on ethnic minorities 
and Islam (Cooke 2008). Autonomy theoretically confers discretion to the governments 
of minority regions to modify national legislation in light of local conditions (Dreyer 
1976; Mackerras 1994; Kaup 2000). However, in practice, the CCP has curtailed the 
capacity of autonomous governments to enact legislation in accordance with religious 
law—for instance, shariʿa (Erie 2013). Thus while, on their face, PRC law and policy are 
neutral toward Islam, the empirics suggest that neutrality, like “rule of law” itself, may 
operate ideologically as a form of control. 
Chinese laws and regulations, in fact, do not recognize shariʿa. Rather, in the 
Chinese legal lexicon, the preferred term is xiguanfa, or “customary law.”8 Customary 
law is understood as premodern and predisposed to reproduce a set of behaviors tied to 
the past and to a specific group or locality (Yang 2003; Jiang 2007, 2010). Furthermore, 
ethnicized customary law plays an important ideological role as a foil to legal modernity, 
an aspirational marker of national progress, as engineered by the ethnically invisible Han 
Chinese and the party-state. In political and academic discourse, customary law pertains 
to a body of rules addressing matters of diet, hygiene, and sometimes marriage and 
inheritance. However, the concept of customary law excludes the following: the textual 
traditions of shariʿa, the sacred nature of its primary sources, the Quran and the hadiths 
(sayings and acts of the Prophet Muhammad), its body of jurisprudence, and the 
transnational and transcendent nature of its jurisdiction. Theoretically, customary law is 
protected under state law. But such instances of local laws, administrative regulations, or 
other rules enforcing or encoding customary law are exceptionally few (Ghai and 
Woodman 2009; Xia 2009).	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The China Islamic Association, 1950 to 2001 
Central to the party-state’s governance over Muslim minorities is the China 
Islamic Association. The CIA, known colloquially as yi-xie 伊协, is introduced by CIA 
propaganda as the “patriotic religious group of all Chinese Muslim ethnicities.” As 
mentioned above, the CIA functions as a bridge between the people’s government and all 
Muslims and promotes the harmonization of Islam with the modern socialist system and 
legal system. The National Representative Assembly of the China Islamic Association, 
the highest organ within the organization, first met in Beijing on May 9, 1953, and passed 
the General Regulations of the CIA.9 The General Regulations of the CIA lays out the 
aims of the association, including implementing party-state religious policies, developing 
the fundamental spirit and great traditions of Islam, representing the lawful rights of all 
Muslims, training Islamic talent, producing scholarship, providing consultation in 
developing new laws and regulations, and developing Islamic curricula. 
 
 
Figure 1. Quranic verse 3:103 (with Chinese translation)—“And hold firmly to the rope 
of Allah all together and do not become divided”—in the front entrance hall of the China 
Islamic Association in Beijing. (Anon. 2009) 
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The CIA is headquartered in Beijing’s Muslim quarter, known as Oxen Street 
(figure 1). To facilitate its mission to coordinate with the party-state, the association 
exists at all administrative levels. Its branch offices in the northwest, such as the Ningxia 
Islamic Association (IA) and the Linxia Prefectural and Linxia City (Hezhou) IAs are 
housed in offices attached to influential mosques.10 IAs at the autonomous region, 
prefectural, county, or city levels are usually administered under the corresponding 
Bureau of Religious Affairs (and party organs behind them), at the same administrative 
level. Thus, their funding and resources come from governmental sources rather than via 
the CIA in Beijing. 
One of the major functions of the CIA is to unite China’s diverse Muslims, 
differentiated by ethnicity, region, and doctrinal orientation, under the leadership of the 
party-state. Ethnic separatism in Xinjiang has been a focus of the work of the CIA. Since 
its incorporation into the Chinese nation-state, Xinjiang has been the most contentious 
border region outside of the Tibetan Autonomous Region (Becquelin 2000; Bovingdon 
2002a; Starr 2004; Clarke 2007). While the People’s Liberation Army and the armed 
police (wujing 武警) have a visible presence in many parts of Xinjiang, particularly in the 
Uyghur-concentrated southern oasis cities, the CIA also plays an important role in the 
party-state’s approach to rule in the westernmost province. The CIA is responsible for 
coordinating with the Bureau of Religious Affairs and the United Work Front, a party 
organ, to vet imam appointments, oversee prayer and the contents of sermons, and 
regulate the use of religious spaces and activities (for example, Sufi activities have been 
tightly constrained in cities like Kashgar and Hotan). 
Whereas Xinjiang presents the party-state with a challenge that has religious, 
ethnic, cultural, and racial dimensions, and that have taken the form, among some 
Uyghurs, of a political movement in the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (Bovingdon 
2010), the practice of Islam by Hui elsewhere in the northwest has frustrated the party’s 
dream of a united multiethnic state in a different way. One of the dominant characteristics 
of Islam as practiced by Hui in the northwest is the presence of multiple and competing 
“teaching schools” (jiaopai 教派) and Sufi organizations (menhuan 门宦), defined by 
their different interpretations of Islamic law and doctrine (e.g., the use of incense during 
Erie   99 
 
Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review 
E-Journal No. 12 (September 2014) • (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-12) 	  
prayer, the reading of the Quran at grave sites, the practice of fidya [lit. “ransom,” or 
atonement], and modes of prayer and remembrance). These teaching schools, including 
the traditionalist Gedimu, mystical Sufis, modernist Yihewani, and neoconservative 
Salafiyya, have historically fought against one another for membership and resources, 
sometimes in bloody and violent conflicts that have required state intervention (Ma 
[1979] 2000). For these reasons, the CIA’s mission is unity, and it promotes this mission 
by appropriating the texts, symbols, and authorities of Islam.11 
Most ahong in Islamic centers in the northwest, like Linxia City, for example, are 
members of their local IA, both at the prefectural and municipal levels. The exam to 
obtain an ahong certificate was historically administered by the local IA (e.g., Linxia City 
Islamic Association), but in 2010, in Gansu, the rule changed such that only the CIA in 
Beijing had the authority to administer the test, making it much more difficult to obtain a 
license.12 
Furthermore, the CIA is responsible for the education and training of ahong. CIA 
oversight over Islamic education assumes various forms. Chiefly, the CIA coordinates the 
curriculum for the state-run madrasas known as Islamic Scriptural Study Institutes 
(yisilanjiao jingxueyuan 伊斯兰教经学院). There are ten such institutes across the 
country and four in the northwest. The Lanzhou Scriptural Study Institute, in Gansu 
Province, was founded in 1984, and teachers there consider it as one grade above a 
madrasa—that is, as a college. The students in 2010, all boys, numbered 220. They attend 
the Lanzhou Scriptural Study Institute for three to four years. The curriculum of the 
school includes the Quran hadiths, fiqh (jurisprudence), doctrine, Arabic, Chinese, 
computing, and “thought and morality.” Law instructors use a variety of sources to teach 
shariʿa, including the fourteenth-century Central Asian text Sharh al-Wiqāya13 and its 
Chinese translations (see, e.g., Ibn Mas’ūd, ‘Ubayd Allāh (Sadr al-Shari’at’) 2008). Most 
students work in the government as civil servants after graduation. Only a minority 
completes the required extra year of training to become ahong. Based on a survey I 
conducted in Linxia City from 2010 to 2011, only one ahong among Linxia City’s thirty-
four mosques had graduated from a state-run scriptural study institute. All others had 
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received their training in mosques that operate as a parallel track for ahong and one that 
is more loosely administered by the relevant IA, governmental, and party units. 
Additionally, the CIA, beginning in the mid-1990s, has held competitions for 
Quran reading (1994) and sermons (1995) that the Chinese Muslims call wo’erzi 卧尔兹 
after the Arabic waʿẓ (admonition). These competitions, which occur at the city, 
provincial, autonomous region, and national levels, are often televised, videotaped, and 
uploaded to Internet sites, both official and popular, such as www.2muslim.com, a forum 
for Chinese Muslim discussions and news. Beginning in 1999, sermons sanctioned by the 
CIA were collected and published as Wo’erzi ji 卧尔兹集 (Collections of Waʿẓ) and 
disseminated to mosques. Ahong were expected to model their Friday sermons on such 
prize-winning examples. Additionally, since 1957, the CIA has published a bimonthly 
magazine called Zhongguo Musilin 中国穆斯林 (China Muslim), which contains news 
relating to meetings of the CIA, well-documented visits by Chinese leaders to Islamic 
institutions, and events depicting Muslims’ engagement in national affairs; 14 
interpretations of Islamic law;15 exemplary sermons, op-eds and discussion pieces; and 
educational matters. Such “mediascapes” (Appadurai 1996, 35) are hardly unique to 
China and shape notions of ethical behavior, social responsibility, pious comportment, 
and devotional practice in Muslim majority states past and present. However, these 
mediascapes are less “counterpublics” (Hirschkind 2006, 106–107) that cut across state 
and society, part deliberation and part discipline, and more one-way messages from the 
state-supported CIA to Muslims. The media use forms like the sermon and magazines to 
communicate Islam’s compatibility with state socialism and Chinese nationalism. 
Thus, the CIA monopolizes the space for civil society between the state and 
Muslim communities. It directs and channels Muslim relations with various state bureaus 
and party organs. In so doing, it marginalizes grassroots Muslim organizations, based 
either in the jamāʿa of the mosque, inter-mosque “teaching schools,” or Sufi solidarities. 
Ahong become the voice of the party-state through their involvement in the CIA. 
According to Weber’s sociology of law, what distinguishes law in a particular context is 
the means by which it is made. In Weber’s typology, the party-state’s use of ahong as 
mouthpieces of religious policy is substantive rationality squared: Islamic law and 
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Communist law both “make law” by following a set of precepts external to the law (i.e., 
the teachings of the Quran and the deeds and sayings of the Prophet, on the one hand, and 
the leadership of the party, on the other). Weber underscored the role of those who 
dominate legal thought and enforce the order that law exists to reproduce (Weber [1922] 
1978b, 784–808). In the example of the ahong, a charismatic Muslim leader is the 
sermonizer of religious law, but one that is specifically filtered through the dictates of 
Chinese socialism and nationalism and state law and policy. The result is that the 
principles of CCP rule dominate those of Islam in shaping Chinese Muslims’ shariʿa 
consciousness. 
 
The Educational Guidance Committee, 2001 to 2014 
To summarize, for the first fifty years of Communist rule (i.e., 1950 to 2000), the 
CCP adopted an approach to shariʿa that demarcated the secular state from religious 
societies by discursively labeling shariʿa as customary law and therefore below state law. 
This approach continued into the reform era, but with economic liberalization, religious 
policy was also (partly) relaxed, which led to a second and different approach. Rather 
than engineering an opposition between state and religion, this approach began to 
mobilize religion as a tool of governance. Specifically, the CIA positioned ahong, Islamic 
authorities, as the spokespeople of party policy and socialist law. 
The party-state’s approach to governing Islam, and the key role of the CIA, 
changed in 2000 to 2001, as a response primarily to domestic affairs but also to 
international events regarding Islam, Muslim minorities, and the so-called War on Terror. 
By the late 1990s, violence between Uyghurs and Han Chinese in Xinjiang had become a 
constant in everyday life in the westernmost province. In 1999, there were a reported 
sixteen incidents in Xinjiang (Bovingdon 2002b, 186–188).16 The so-called three evil 
forces—religious extremism, splittism (territorial secession), and terrorism—informed 
the government’s policies toward Xinjiang. Following the 9/11 attacks in the United 
States, the state’s depiction of violence in Xinjiang as “terrorism” was given greater 
support, partly by the Bush administration, which, in 2002, added the Eastern Turkestan 
Islamic Movement to its list of outlawed terrorist organizations. Turmoil in Xinjiang had 
long predated the People’s Republic of China or the 9/11 conception of “terrorism.” 
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Nonetheless, after 9/11, any violence or antistate behavior by Uyghurs in Xinjiang has 
been couched as “terrorism.” For instance, after knife attacks in Kunming, Yunnan, on 
March 1, 2014, allegedly committed by Uyghurs, that resulted in the death of 33 people, 
with 140 others injured, Guo Chengzhen, vice chairman and secretary general of the CIA, 
called the acts “a grand conspiracy” (dayinmou 大阴谋) and recommended that the state 
promulgate a counterterrorism law (Anon. 2014). 
As a consequence, beginning in 2001, policies toward Islam in China focused on 
the Xinjiang problem. 17  While inaugurated by dynamics in Xinjiang, state policy 
following 2001 has, in fact, impacted Muslims outside of Xinjiang, including the Chinese 
Muslims, or Hui. Although conflicts between Hui communities and Han-Han or Hui-
Tibetan communities are not uncommon in the northwest and occasionally require state 
intervention, rarely have state media called such conflicts “terrorist.” Nonetheless, 
changes pursuant to domestic and international antiterrorist policies in the aftermath of 
9/11 similarly affected all Muslim minorities in China. 
While political and academic discourses that produce shariʿa as customary law 
continue to the present day, the CIA has stepped up its efforts to instill “patriotic 
education” in ahong through both formal instruction and state-sanctioned weekly prayer 
sermons. Beginning with curricular reform in the Islamic Scriptural Study Institutes, in 
2001, the CIA convened the Symposium on National and Local Scriptural Study 
Institutes’ Teaching Materials Work (Quanguo he difang jingxueyuan jiaocai gongzuo 
zuotanhui 全国和地方经学院教材工作座谈会) and the following year established the 
Office for Coordinating the Editing of the China Islamic Association Teaching Material 
(Zhongguo yisilanjiao xiehui jiaocai bianshen xietiao bangongshi 中国伊斯兰教协会教
材编审协调办公室). After five years of work, the CIA published a series of textbooks 
(see table 1). 
The ten textbooks were designed to unify curricula across the Islamic Scriptural 
Study Institutes. The textbooks provide a state view of Islamic law, history, and doctrine, 
and seek to consolidate understandings of shariʿa through established state discourses. 
Thus, A Concise Course in Islamic Law includes a section on “Islamic Law in China,” 
which uses the trope of domestication (bentuhua 本土化) (Yang 2003; Ma 2005), 
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common in academic writings on Islam in China, to describe shariʿa not as a transcendent 
order of law that unites the global umma (global community of Muslims) but as a 
localized and ethnicized religious (defined in the Chinese context as nonpolitical) belief 
(Zhongguo Yisilanjiao xiehui quanguo jingxueyuan tongbian jiaocai bianshen 
weiyuanhui 2008, 103–105). Furthermore, A Concise Course in Islamic Law excludes 
any discussion of shariʿa in China following the Republican period. 
 
Table 1. List of Textbooks for Reform of Scriptural Study Institute Curriculum 
 
 Original Chinese Title English Translation of Title 
1 Gulanjing jichu 
jianming jiaocheng 古兰经基础简明
教程 
A concise course in the basics of the 
Quran  
2 Shengxun jichu jianming jiaocheng 圣
训基础简明教程 
A concise course in the basics of the 
hadiths  
3 Gulanjing fenlei jianming jiaocheng 
古兰经分类简明教程 
A concise course in the classifications 
in the Quran  
4 Shengxun fenlei jianming jiaocheng 圣
训分类简明教程 
A concise course in the classifications 
of the hadiths  
5 Yisilanjiaoyi jianming jiaocheng 伊斯
兰教义简明教程 
A concise course in Islamic doctrine  
6 Yisilanjiaofa jianming jiaocheng 伊斯
兰教法简明教程 
A concise course in Islamic law  
7 Shijie Yisilanjiao shi jianming 
jiaocheng 世界伊斯兰教史简明教程 
A concise course in global Islamic 
history  
8 Zhongguo Yisilanjiao shi jianming 
jiaocheng 中国伊斯兰教史简明教程 
A concise course in Chinese Islamic 
history  
9 Gulanjing songduxue jianming 
jiaocheng 古兰经诵读学简明教程 
A concise course in Quranic recitation  
10 Alabo wenshufa jianming jiaocheng 
阿拉伯文书法简明教程 
A concise course in Arabic calligraphy  
 
The textbooks demonstrate the CIA’s attempt to expound the norms of Islam 
through the directives of Chinese socialism. The CIA took a further step in 
operationalizing shariʿa for the purpose of enforcing socialist policy by establishing a 
committee specifically to interpret shariʿa in accordance with party policy and state law. 
The EAGC, formed in 2001,18 was conceived to be China’s ulama, the most learned of 
China’s ahong, who would advise the state on matters of Islamic law. According to 
internal CIA memoranda, the EAGC was created to “actively guide innovative measures 
for the adaptation of Islam to socialist society” (jiji yindao Yisilanjiao yu shehuizhuyi 
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shehui xiang shiying de chuangxin cuoshi 积极引导伊斯兰教与社会主义向适应的创新
措施 ). Significantly, the EAGC was to accomplish such harmonization through 
“correctly expounding the classical religious doctrine” (zhengque jieshi jingdian jiaoyi  
正确解释经典教义).19 
The EAGC is headed by Chen Guangyuan, an ahong groomed in the Beijing 
Islamic Scriptural Study Institute and former director of the CIA.20 Chen Guangyuan has 
headed the three committee sessions of the EAGC since its founding. While scholars 
have argued that the CIA recruits disproportionately from the Yihewani, or modernist, 
“teaching school” (Berlie 2004; Israeli and Gardner-Rush 2007)21, and there may have 
been evidence of such overrepresentation from the 1950s to the 1990s, the CIA today, 
and the ESC in particular, recruits ahong without preference for any particular “teaching 
school.” The main criterion for recruitment is advanced study and standing in the Muslim 
community. Appointments to party organs like the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference are also deemed valuable. 
The ESC centers around the concept of jiejing 解经 (lit. “expound the classic”), 
or explanation of shariʿa. While the Chinese word may appear to be a cognate for 
methods of deriving law in the Islamic tradition, a closer examination of the sources 
produced by the EAGC demonstrates that its intellectual labor is more a form of 
postsecular propaganda than a Chinese Islamic jurisprudence. The EAGC performs the 
work of jiejing through two main forms or media. The first one is familiar—the sermon. 
The EAGC has published some forty-six sermons in several edited volumes called 
Collections of Newly Edited Wo’erzi Speeches (Xinbian wo’erzi yanjiangji 新编卧尔兹
演讲集) (Chen 2011, 13). These collections of sermons, of which some eight hundred 
thousand copies have been distributed to mosques throughout China, explain state 
interests through the Quran and the hadiths (Chen 2011, 13–14). In particular, the 
sermons communicate such principles as “love state, love religion” (aiguo aijiao 爱国爱
教), “maintain ethnic unity” (weihu minzu tuanti 维护民族团体), “social stability” 
(shehui wending 社会稳定), and “[state] law dignity and national unity” (falü zunyan he 
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guojia tongyi 法律尊严和国家统一). The members of the ESC, China’s “ulama,” 
explain Chinese socialist ideology through reference to the teachings of Islam. 
Modifying Weber, members of the EAGC and ahong who use their sermons 
exercise substantive rational thinking—that is, explaining Islam not necessarily through a 
set of principles expounded by the Prophet Muhammad, but through party propaganda. 
For instance, one sermon entitled “Islam Advocates Unity and Harmony” (Yisilanjiao 
tichang tuanjie hemu 伊斯兰教提倡团结和睦) begins with the favored Quranic verse of 
the CIA that commands, “And hold firmly to the rope of Allah all together and do not 
become divided”22 (nimen dangquanti zhichi Zhenzhu de shengsuo, bu yao fenlien 你们
当全体支持真主的绳索，不要分裂), and the hadith that states, “Muslim to Muslim just 
like structurally sound architecture, reinforcing each other” (Mumin zhiyu mumin, youru 
jiegou yanjin de jianzhu, bici xianglian 穆民之于穆民，犹如结构严谨的建筑，彼此相
联). After these references, the remainder of the sermon reads like an official statement 
on religion by Hu Jintao, then-general secretary of the CCP and president of the PRC, 
pursuant to this theory of “harmonious society”: 
From the above teachings derived from the classics, we can grasp that 
Islam advocates unity and opposes division. Unity is the virtue of us 
Muslims, it is the core of one family, one collective, one society, and the 
source of Muslims’ strength. The early Muslims obeyed the commands of 
Allah and the teachings of the Prophet. They were of universal agreement 
in creating, in the history of humanity, the great Islamic civilization. With 
the lapse of time, we cannot fail to see that there are a few among us for 
whom the scriptures’ call for unity and opposition to division has faded 
from memory. (Chen 2003, 90) 
 
If the authorities of Islam (i.e., Allah, the Prophet, scriptures) are replaced by the 
“state,” the sermon recalls earlier Leninist techniques of the “mass line” that used 
persuasion, exhortation, and propaganda to create solidarity vis-à-vis class (Lubman 
1999, 42) or, in this case, sinful and divisive “enemies.” Rather than use Maoist slogans 
to raise class consciousness or glorify the proletariat, the CIA sermons employ the 
language of Islam to elevate shariʿa consciousness among Chinese Muslims as 
interpreted through the lens of socialism. The result of either is to unite followers under 
the authority of the party that itself has undergone significant transformation over the last 
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sixty years (Li 2008). As with capitalism, Islam is an inevitable force shaping modernity 
in China. The party’s response has been not to ideologically exclude Islam, but to 
assimilate it. Just as entrepreneurs and capitalists were welcomed into the CCP in 2000 
via then-general secretary Jiang Zemin’s slogan “the three represents,” the reliance on 
religious leaders to communicate party policy and state law to religionists has increased 
in the reform era. 
The second product of the ESC’s “expounding of scriptures” takes the form of a 
body of what it deems “Islamic law,” broadly defined through the mandates of Chinese 
socialism in order to buttress governmental power among Muslim minorities. From 2001 
to 2011, the EAGC produced some six collections of what it terms “fatwa,” or legal 
opinions on specific matters. These so-called fatwa are published in the Jiaowu zhidao 
tongxun 教务指导通讯 (EAGC Communications, hereinafter tongxun). It should be 
emphasized that the tongxun are not fatwa, according to the requirements of Muslim 
jurists. Originally, Islamic jurisprudence required that only mujtahids, those trained in 
“independent reasoning” (ijtāhid), could issue these nonbinding sources of law, although 
this requirement was later modified to include all trained jurists. However, the members 
of the EAGC do not meet even that requirement. The tongxun address a range of issues, 
from defining jihad to prescribing proper dress for Muslims. Furthermore, the tongxun 
claim that the members of the EAGC consulted foreign sources in compiling the tongxun. 
For example, in 2003, when the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic 
spread through China, the EAGC consulted bodies of legal authorities in Islamic 
countries to gain insight on minimizing its spread, particularly with reference to legal 
regulations, derived from shariʿa, regarding disposal of the remains of SARS victims 
(Chen 2011). 
Like the overall concept of “expounding the scriptures,” the tongxun are Chinese 
Islamic versions of Islamic legal methods. A minority of ahong I spoke with in northwest 
China agreed that the EAGC was the Chinese ulama  (almost always these ahong held 
senior positions in their respective Islamic Associations). Furthermore, they viewed the 
members of the EAGC as producing an indigenous fiqh, or body of Chinese Islamic 
jurisprudence specifically tailored to the condition of Islam in China. Indeed, some of the 
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Islamic sources valued as compatible with Chinese socialism have “trickled down” and 
permeated Muslim communities. When asked if there were conflicts between socialism 
and Islam, a common response among Hui who had worked in governmental departments 
was the Quranic verse, “You must submit to Allah, submit to the messenger and the 
person who takes charge among you” (4:59), interpreting the third authority as the 
Chinese government. 
 
Conclusion 
 In reform China, while the official policy is religious freedom, the state tightly 
regulates all aspects of religious life. For Muslims, whereas state law recognizes aspects 
of shariʿa, mainly dietary rules, and allows Muslims to exercise ritual aspects of shariʿa, 
including ablutions, prayer, and recitation, other aspects of shariʿa, including those 
pertaining to family matters (e.g., marriage, divorce, inheritance, and property) fail to 
receive protection under state law. Thus, the experience of Muslim minorities in China is 
a state policy that is not neutral (as Western liberal states claim to be) but of selective 
recognition, if not hostility. Nonetheless, even in authoritarian China, the state has turned 
to religious authorities, including ahong, to supplement party rule. 
 The China case shows an arc of legal pluralism. Beginning in the 1950s and 
heightening in the decade of the Cultural Revolution, the state sought to excoriate 
religious law, including shariʿa. During this period, shariʿa became naturalized as 
“customary law,” a parochial and ethnic-bound set of apolitical rules. The CIA was 
established to communicate state law and party policy to Muslim communities, but its 
role in the public sphere was sharply limited. Next, with the reforms in the 1980s, the 
discursive denigration of shariʿa continued with only a gradual relaxation as ahong 
studied abroad in Muslim countries, more Chinese performed the hajj, and economic ties 
between China and the Middle East grew stronger. The CIA’s position increased in 
importance as the state sought to depoliticize sermons and shariʿa itself by monopolizing 
their definitions. 
 Finally, after the late 1990s, a period of turmoil in Xinjiang, and the aftermath of 
9/11 on the international response to “terrorism,” the state has operationalized shariʿa for 
secular rule. Muslims comply with the speech and model of the charismatic authority of 
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the ahong. The state, recognizing the predisposition of Muslim masses to obey their 
ahong, has appropriated their religious authority for that of the atheist party. The ahong 
have become spokesmen (they are almost all male in the northwest) for a shariʿa that is 
interpreted through the tenets of Chinese socialism, national belonging, and Muslim 
unity. The domination by one set of areligious principles (i.e., that of Chinese socialism) 
over one that is derived from sacred texts (i.e., that of Islam) underlies postsecularism as 
a method of rule. In an interview conducted after riots between Uyghurs and Han Chinese 
in Urumqi on July 5, 2009, during which nearly two hundred people were killed, Chen 
Guangyuan, as both a Hui leader and member of the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference National Ethnic and Religious Affairs Committee, concluded of 
the rioters: 
They were influenced by external separatist forces [jingwai fenlie shili 境
外分裂势力]. The external and internal structures colluded to beat, smash, 
loot, torch, and kill. So this is not a religious problem, and it is not an 
ethnic problem. Rather, it’s a deeply rooted struggle between separatism 
and counterseparatism and safeguarding the national unity and 
undermining the national unity. (Zhang 2010) 
 
Through such communications, charisma, as embodied in the authority of Chen 
Guangyuan, becomes, as Weber remarked, “part of everyday life” ([1922] 1978b, 1123) 
for Muslim minorities in reform-era China. 
None of the above, however, is to conclude that postsecularism as governance is 
one-way, inevitable, hegemonic, or even wholly effective. The party-state’s approach to 
governing Islam through Muslim elites and a selective translation of shariʿa faces several 
problems. The limits of the postsecular are seen, for example, in the failure of the EAGC 
to gain widespread support. Most ahong and almost all Hui scholars discredit the EAGC 
as China’s ulama, citing the committee members’ lack of credentials to interpret shariʿa. 
The tongxun no longer circulate and are nearly impossible to find in China. Ironically, 
their material has most likely been rendered too sensitive and therefore been censored by 
state religious authorities. As a result, the EAGC has stopped producing the tongxun. 
The limits of the EAGC’s project to use Islamic scripture to expound socialism to 
Muslim minorities demonstrate that the party-state does not act with one mind. As 
experienced in the Chinese context, postsecularism, as the state’s appropriation, rather 
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than exclusion of religious law, invites a multiplicity of voices to define religion and 
religious law in the public sphere. Actors that are not strictly under the state, including 
quasigovernmental institutes like the EAGC, may derive solutions to issues that diverge 
from state prescriptions. Despite the growing pluralization of China’s public sphere, the 
state nonetheless retains its power of censorship. If non-state actors exceed their mandate 
of authority, the state censor intervenes. To return to Casanova, rather than 
deprivatization, such projects that veer from state agendas can still be thoroughly and 
authoritatively privatized. Yet in postsecularism, jurisdictional lines are increasingly 
blurred as the state depends on religious authorities to communicate policy to the faithful. 
As additional evidence of the limits of postsecularism, nearly all ahong still prefer 
to receive training in a popular or unofficial mosque rather than in the state-run Islamic 
Scriptural Study Institute, with its set of standardized texts. Most remarkably, small 
cabals of Hui who have studied abroad are actively translating Arabic texts on legal 
issues into Chinese versions that circumvent the official censure. If there is a 
“jurisprudence of minorities” being written in China, it is more likely to be authored by 
these grassroots scholars than simulacral ulama. Postsecular logics may undo themselves. 
The multiplication and diversification of channels for making law may decenter the state 
and its monopoly on law.  
 
Matthew S. Erie is a postdoctoral research associate at the Princeton Institute for 
International and Regional Studies and a 2013 Henry Luce Foundation/ACLS China 
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Notes 
 
1 Following the Boston Marathon bombings on April 15, 2013, motivated, 
according to most reports, by anti-American views inspired by radical Islam, the 
relationship between the secular and the religious was again thrust into national 
and global debates, both popular and academic. 
2 For Arabic Romanization, I use the International Journal of Middle Eastern 
Studies style. 
3 An exception, of course, is the rules of succession that may be rooted in a formal 
procedure of rules (e.g., the succession of the Dalai Lama) or may remain simply 
a function of the individual choice of the charismatic leader (Weber [1922] 1978a, 
246–247).  
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4 Research for this paper is based on nineteen months of fieldwork, conducted from 
2009 to 2012 in northwest China, with support provided by the Fulbright-Hays 
Doctoral Dissertation Research Program and the National Science Foundation. 
5 Qadi administered justice as the lowest level of the official administration 
throughout the Tang and Song periods (618 C.E.–1279 C.E.). In the Mongolian-
dominated Yuan period (1271–1368), the qadi were incorporated into the judicial 
administration as the Bureau of the Qadi (Huihui hadesi 回回哈的司). The end of 
the qadi is not well understood in Chinese history but is most likely a combination 
of Sinicization and reliance on non-Muslim Han Chinese magistrates as resolvers 
of disputes, as well as imperial policy antagonistic to Muslim authority, 
particularly in the Qing period (1636–1911) (Lipman 1999, 2005).  
6 China has approximately twenty million Muslims, including Chinese Muslims 
(Hui), Turkic Muslims (e.g., Uyghurs), and Mongolian Muslims (Dongxiang), the 
vast majority of whom are Sunni and adhere to the Hanafi school of 
jurisprudence. Although the Hui live throughout China, most Hui and almost all 
Turkic Muslims and Mongolian Muslims live in the northwest region, including 
Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, Gansu Province, Qinghai Province, and 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.  
7 Ahong is the Chinese transliteration of the Persian word meaning “the learned.” 
Note that ahong were mosque leaders before the CCP’s assumption of power and 
for most of Islam’s history in China.  
8 The term xiguan 习惯 has a long genealogy in legal modernization in China. The 
Communists borrowed the term from the Republicans who ruled China from 1911 
to 1949 and who, in turn, adapted the concept from late-Qing legal reformers who 
themselves received the word from Japanese jurists (Dicks 1990, 366–367; 
Bourgon 2005).  
9 General Regulations of the China Islamic Association (Zhongguo Yisilanjiao 
xiehui jianzhang 中国伊斯兰教协会简章), passed May 11, 1953. In accordance 
with broader shifts in party-state reform from the 1950s to the 1980s, the name of 
the governing rules was changed from the Soviet-sounding “General Regulations” 
(jianzhang 简章) to the more globally fashionable “Constitution” (zhangcheng 章
程) in the 1980s. See also the Report on the Work of the Planning Committee of 
the China Islamic Association (Zhongguo Yisilanjiao xiehui choubei weiyuanhui 
gongzuo baogao 中国伊斯兰教协会筹备委员会工作报告), passed May 11, 
1953. 
10 The Ningxia CIA was based at the Yihewani mosque named Zhongsi 中寺 
(Central Mosque) in Yinchuan until 2009–2010, when it moved to a new office 
building elsewhere. The Linxia Prefectural and Linxia City IA are housed next to 
the Salafiyya mosque called Xin Wang Si 新王寺 (New Wang Mosque). The 
Salafiyya have been a source of governmental scrutiny since they entered China 
in the 1930s. It is little wonder that the current location of the IA headquarters is a 
stone’s throw away from the oldest Salafiyya mosque in Hezhou.  
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11 Upon entering the CIA building in Beijing, one is confronted with the Quranic 
verse 3:103, written in Chinese and Arabic: “And hold firmly to the rope of Allah 
all together and do not become divided.”  
12 Similarly, the CIA, in coordination with the Bureau of Religious Affairs and the 
United Work Front, limits the movements of Muslim students, or manla 曼拉. In 
2011, manla were required to register at one mosque or Sufi institution only. 
Uyghur students who, since the July 2009 riot in Urumqi, sought to study Islam in 
neighboring provinces were particularly subjected to surveillance and monitoring.  
13 The Sharh al-Wiqāya (Explanation of the protection) is a synopsis of a thirteenth-
century manual of legal rulings in the Hanafi school called the Hidāya. 
14 For example, a 2008 issue had one section on “The Beijing Olympics and Me” 
and depicted athletes from Middle Eastern countries visiting with Hui in Beijing 
(Ma 2008). 
15 Such analyses are usually topical summaries of the Quran or hadiths or answers to 
specific questions, such as why Muslims abstain from eating pork and whether 
women can join the hajj.  
16 The incidents range from gunfights and stabbings to religious incitement and 
organized protests. Most incidents involved a handful of people; others, such as 
the riot in Lop on August 9, 1999, involved some six thousand people (Bovingdon 
2002b, 187).  
17 Scholarship has, accordingly, concentrated on state policy in Xinjiang following 
9/11, with particular reference, for example, to the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO). The SCO was founded in 2001 in Shanghai by its members, 
including China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. 
The multilateral organization coordinates security, military, and economic affairs 
in the region and has consistently identified antiterrorism measures as one of its 
unifying objectives (Bovingdon 2002b; Gladney 2004a; Rudelson and Jankowiak 
2004). 
18 The EAGC was formed on April 23, 2001, and thus its establishment predated the 
9/11 attacks; however, the committee appears to have taken on greater 
significance following the Chinese government’s response to perceived terrorist 
activity in Xinjiang.  
19 Internal CIA memoranda.  
20 Chen Guangyuan began his Islamic training at a mosque in Shenyang in 1944. In 
1952, for two years, he studied Arabic at a Hui academy in Beijing. In 1955, he 
studied at the China Islamic Scriptural Study Institute. In 1958 to the beginning of 
the Cultural Revolution in 1966, he served as ahong at several mosques in 
Beijing. Subsequently, he served as president of the CIA, dean of the China 
Islamic Scriptural Study Institute, vice-premier of the China Religion and Peace 
Committee, and consultant to the China International Friendship Contact 
Committee. His leadership of the CIA was constant beginning in 2000, when he 
also took up positions in the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 
(CPPCC). Most recently, he was elected member of the Standing Committee of 
the CPPCC in March 2013.  
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21 The standard argument is that because the Yihewani “teaching school” endorses a 
modernist vision of Islam and opposes the practices of Sufis, such as veneration 
of the saint, it has received greater support from the state than Sufi or Salafiyya 
groups.  
22 Quran 3:103.  
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